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Abstract
While in principle, international payments could be carried out using any cur-
rency or set of currencies, in practice, the US dollar is predominant in international
trade and ﬁnancial ﬂows. The dollar acts as a ‘vehicle currency’ in the sense that
agents in non-dollar economies will generally engage in currency trade indirectly us-
ing the US dollar rather than using direct bilateral trade among their own currencies.
Indirect trade is desirable when there are transactions costs of exchange. This paper
constructs a dynamic general equilibrium model of a vehicle currency. We explore the
nature of the eﬃciency gains arising from a vehicle currency, and show how this de-
pends on the total number of currencies in existence, the size of the vehicle currency
economy, and the monetary policy followed by the vehicle currency’s government. We
ﬁnd that there can be very large welfare gains to a vehicle currency in a system of
many independent currencies. But these gains are asymmetrically weighted towards
the residents of the vehicle currency country. The survival of a vehicle currency places
natural limits on the monetary policy of the vehicle country.
JEL classiﬁcations: F40, F30, E42.
Keywords: Vehicle currency; Transactions cost; Welfare gains.
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A universal feature of international monetary systems is the predominance of one currency
in facilitating international trade and ﬁnancial ﬂows. Since the middle of the 20th century,
the US dollar has played the role of an international currency. But before the ﬁrst world
war, the British pound was the most accepted international currency, and before that, in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it was the Dutch guilder. In frictionless models
of international trade there is no reason for exchange between countries to take place in
any particular currency. In practice, however, the presence of transactions costs of trading
l e a d sa g e n t st om a k ea n dr e c e i v ep a y m e n t si nac u r r e n c yw h i c hh a sah i g ht r a d ev o l u m e ,
and is widely acceptable to all countries. A very large proportion of international exchange
in currencies has the US dollar on one side of the transaction (BIS, 2008). In this sense
the dollar acts as a ‘vehicle currency’. It is cheaper for payments between agents in small
countries with thinly traded currencies to be made indirectly using US dollars than to use
direct bilateral trade in their own currency markets.
While the eﬃciency beneﬁts of a vehicle currency in avoiding transactions costs of
trade are clear, they also introduce an asymmetry into the international monetary system
by giving a central role to one currency. This may give the residents of the country issuing
that currency an advantage, either in the ease with which payments may be made, or
through the direct gains from issuing a currenc yw h i c hi si nd e m a n db yr e s i d e n t so fo t h e r
currencies. In addition, by their very nature, vehicle currencies are likely to become locked
in a way which gives the issuer of the currency a natural monopoly. On the other hand, the
historical record shows that the international system does abandon international currencies
and adopts alternative currencies. Is it likely, for instance, that the vehicle currency role of
the dollar will be given up in favor of the euro in the future? The option of using alternative
currencies as vehicles may place a constraint on the policy actions of monetary and ﬁscal
authorities of vehicle currency countries.
The economics literature has long recognized the beneﬁts of a vehicle currency as a
solution to a problem of transactions costs (e.g. Krugman, 1980, Black, 1991). But this
literature has almost wholly been either simply descriptive, or based on partial equilibrium
models in which relative prices or trades are exogenous. There are few general equilibrium
models analyzing the way in which a vehicle currency facilitates international exchange (see
below for references). In the absence of such a framework, it is not possible to assess the
eﬃciency gains to a vehicle currency, nor to address the nature of the asymmetry inherent
in such a system, or the limits on economic policies that are necessary to maintain the role
of a vehicle currency.
This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model of a vehicle currency. In our
model, a vehicle currency arises as an equilibrium precisely in the manner described in the
narrative descriptions; by eliminating costly bilateral exchange in small currency markets,
a vehicle currency can reduce the transactions cost of exchange. But the advantage of
a fully speciﬁed general equilibrium model is that we can be precise about the trading
mechanism underlying a vehicle currency equilibrium, the eﬀect of a vehicle currency on
equilibrium exchange rates, and the nature and magnitude of gains to a vehicle currency.
1In addition, we use the model to analyze the speciﬁc gains to the issuer of such a currency.
Finally, we can explore how a vehicle currency arises, and the constraints on monetary
policy necessary for a vehicle currency to survive.
We build a multi-country monetary exchange economy model. The money of a partic-
ular country is required to ﬁnance purchases in that country, through a cash-in-advance
constraint. But the way in which agents acquire foreign currencies may diﬀer. We model
foreign exchange trade as a costly process that takes place through ‘trading post’ tech-
nologies. Trading posts have been modelled by Shapley and Shubik (1977), Starr (2000)
and Howitt (2005). They represent locations where agents can go in order to buy or sell
one currency for another; that is, they facilitate bilateral trade in currencies. But trading
posts are costly to set up. In a purely symmetric world, there would be one trading post
for all possible bilateral pair of currencies. Trading possibilities would be the same for the
holders of any currency, so that currencies and countries would be treated equally. But in
a world with a large number of currencies, this environment would involve signiﬁcant real
resources used up in setting up trading posts.
An alternative equilibrium is where one country operates as a ‘vehicle currency’. This
oﬀers signiﬁcant eﬃciencies, since less resources are used up in trading. At the same time
however, it confers signiﬁcant beneﬁts on the vehicle currency issuer. The main object of
the paper is to explore this trade oﬀ.
Our model has N>3 countries, labeled 1,2,...,N. In a Symmetric Trading Equilib-
rium, there are N(N −1)/2 bilateral foreign exchange trading posts, and agents from any
country can use their currency directly to buy the currency of any other country. In a
Vehicle Currency Equilibrium, country 1 acts as an intermediary. There are only N − 1
trading posts, with currency 1 being on one side of all currency trades. Agents from any
country i>1 who wish to purchase currency j/ ∈ {i,1} must ﬁrst purchase currency 1 and
then use currency 1 to purchase currency j.
The gains to a Vehicle Currency Equilibrium come from being able to facilitate all
possible trades while reducing the number of trading posts by (N/2 − 1)(N − 1). For
large N, these gains may be substantial. The gains are reﬂe c t e di ns m a l l e rb i d - a s ks p r e a d s
in currency markets. But the gains are unevenly distributed. Residents of the issuing
country have the same opportunity set as in a Symmetric Trading Equilibrium, since they
can directly buy the currency of any other country. But residents of the peripheral countries
(i.e. all countries i>1) must visit two trading posts in order to complete an exchange with
another peripheral country. This imposes additional costs of trade. We ﬁnd that a Vehicle
Currency Equilibrium always beneﬁts residents of country 1. But residents of peripheral
countries may lose or gain.
The model points to three key features in the assessment of the gains to a vehicle
currency. The ﬁrst is the number of currencies. The more independent countries and cur-
rencies, the greater are the transactions cost gains to using a vehicle currency in exchange.
With only a small number of currencies, a vehicle currency will not oﬀer much welfare
gain for peripheral countries, because the costs of indirect exchange will oﬀset the gains
to reduced transactions costs for peripheral countries. The second key feature is the size
of countries. Larger countries have a natural advantage as providers of the vehicle cur-
2rency because they engage in more international trade than smaller countries, leading to
larger volume in foreign exchange markets. Finally, the monetary policy followed by the
authority of the vehicle currency is a crucial determinant of the size and distribution of
the gains to a vehicle currency. A higher rate of inﬂation in the vehicle country shifts the
transactions gains away from the rest of the world, and towards vehicle currency residents.
But if the vehicle country is large, the use of a vehicle currency may still oﬀer substantial
beneﬁt s ,e v e nw i t hq u i t eah i g hr a t eo fi n ﬂation. There is a natural trade-oﬀ between size
and inﬂation.
We use the model to explore the degree to which a vehicle currency is sustainable.
Because the model combines ﬁxed costs and ‘network externalities’, there are many Nash
equilibria of the conventional type that are robust to deviation by individual agents. In
order to explore the robustness of a vehicle currency equilibrium we investigate the in-
centives for deviation by aggregate groups of agents. We show that the robustness of a
vehicle currency depends in very intuitive way on the three features just described. There
is a three-way trade-oﬀ between monetary policy, country size, and the number of curren-
cies that are required to prevent peripheral countries from deviation from vehicle currency
equilibrium. We show that the introduction of a single currency area among peripheral
countries (such as the euro) tends to signiﬁcantly tighten the constraints imposed on a
vehicle currency in order to maintain robustness of the vehicle currency equilibrium. This
is because a single currency area simultaneously reduces the number of existing currencies,
reducing the transactions costs gains to a vehicle currency, and increases the economic size
of the area issuing a peripheral currency. Both these eﬀects tend to work together to make
a vehicle currency less robust.
There is a relatively small literature on the nature of an international currency. Krug-
man (1980) deﬁnes a vehicle currency in the same way that is used here, within a partial
equilibrium setting, and explores alternative trading patterns. Rey (2001) examines how
increasing returns to scale technologies in ﬁnancial markets may give rise to an international
currency. Hartmann (1998) looks at a model of a vehicle currency in ﬁnancial markets and
endogenizes a bid-ask spread. A diﬀerent literature on search and money has explored the
use of international currencies in an environment where agents can choose the currency
they will hold to make purchases (e.g. Matsuyama et al., 1993, Wright and Trejos, 2001).
This diﬀers from ours principally in that we assume the existence of a cash-in-advance
constraint for all goods purchases, but look speciﬁc a l l ya tt h en a t u r eo ft r a d eb e t w e e n
currencies.1
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the basic model. Section 3
analyzes the equilibrium where all bilateral trading posts exist. Section 4)analyzes the
equilibrium with a vehicle currency and explores the comparison with the symmetric equi-
librium. Section 5 explores the robustness of the Vehicle Currency Equilibrium. Some
conclusions then follow.
1Head and Shi (2003) construct a search-based model of two countries in which goods trade for money,
and monies also trade for one another. Goldberg and Tille (2005) use the term ‘vehicle currency’ to refer
to a sitution where a ﬁrm may set a price for sale to a foreign customer in the currency of a third currency.
This is quite diﬀerent from the sense in which we use the term.
32. The Model
2.1. Technology and Preferences
Time is discrete, indexed by t =0 ,1,....T h e r e a r e N ≥ 3 countries, indexed by i =
1,2,...,N. The world population is normalized to unity. Country i has population ni,s o
that ΣN
i=1ni =1 . W ec a l lni the size of country i. The world economy has a continuum
of goods of measure one. Country i is endowed with measure ni of these types of goods,
with each resident being endowed with one unit of a particular type of good. Thus, the
endowment per capita is the same across countries (i.e., 1).2 All goods are perishable at
the end of a period.
Within a country, all households are alike. Let cij represent the consumption by a
country i resident of each of the nj goods produced by country j. Because all goods
endowed to a country are symmetric, a country i household’s total utility in a period from















where β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor. Throughout the analysis, we will assume that
u(c)=l n ( c).
Until the end of section 5, we assume that each country has its own currency. Residents
of a country receive lump-sum transfers only from their own country’s monetary authority.
Let mij be the stock of currency j held by a country i household, normalized by the total
stock of currency j. If country i residents hold all their own currency, then symmetry
within a country implies that mii =1 /ni. The gross rate of growth of currency i is deﬁned
as γi. Proceeds from money growth are transferred to domestic households. Let τi denote
the transfer to each country i household, normalized by money stock. This implies that
τi =( γi − 1)/(γini).
2.2. Monetary Exchange at Trading Posts
Purchases of country i’s goods must use only currency i.T h i sr e p r e s e n t sac a s hi na d v a n c e
constraint at the national level. Therefore, in order to consume country j’s good, a house-
hold in country i must obtain currency j. The purpose of imposing this constraint is to
focus on the exchange between currencies, rather than between currencies and goods.3
Currency trade is organized in bilateral trading posts. At a trading post, one currency
is exchanged for another. There can be many agents on each side of a trading post. We
order the two currencies at a post in ascending order and refer to a trading post with
2This modelling of country size and endowments allows us to vary the size of a country without aﬀecting
the endowment per capita (or “productivity”) of that country.
3One way to view this assumption is as a result of a legal restriction on settlement with domestic
currency within a domestic market.
4currencies k and j as post kj,w h e r ek<j .T h e r e c a n n o t b e i n s t antaneous arbitrage
between trading posts or shorting on a currency.4
Operating a trading post involves a ﬁxed cost. In order to operate trading post kj,t h e
m a n a g e ro fat r a d i n gp o s tm u s ti n c u raﬁxed cost φ in both goods k and j.T h e r ei sa l s o
a cash-in-advance constraint on trading posts - the ﬁxed cost in each country’s good needs
to be paid in that country’s money. Examples of this ﬁxed cost include the wage cost of
workers who operate the post and the amortized amount of the initial cost of setting up
the post. For simplicity, we abstract from the ﬂexible cost that depends positively on the
trading volume at the post.
Trading posts are a contestable market (see Tirole, 1988, p308). That is, anyone can
set up a trading post and oﬀer prices for the exchange between two currencies, but only
one successful manager will run a trading post with zero net proﬁt. The manager of each
trading post announces two prices for a pairwise trade, one for sale of a currency (ask) for
another currency, and one for purchase (bid) of a currency for another currency. Under
the assumption of contestable markets, there is Bertrand competition among managers at
the stage of entering the market (see Howitt, 2005, for a similar formulation). Thus, the
manager of a trading post surviving the competition oﬀers the bid and ask prices that are
just suﬃcient to cover the ﬁxed costs of setting up the trading post, given the buyers and
sellers of the currency pair in which the trading post operates. These prices then represent
the equilibrium nominal exchange rates for each currency pair.
With N countries and trading posts for each pair of currencies, there are N(N − 1)/2
possible trading posts. But with each trading post incurring ﬁxed costs, in principle this
can be improved upon by using one currency as an intermediate, and trading twice, buying
the intermediate, or ‘vehicle’ currency, and then selling it to obtain the currency required
for purchasing the desired goods. When one currency plays the role of a ‘vehicle’, then
only N − 1 trading posts need to exist in order to facilitate trade between all countries.
With ﬁxed costs of setting up trading posts, there can be many Nash equilibria that
diﬀer from each other in the number of active posts. To see this, suppose that an agent
believes that no (or only a few) other agents will go to a particular trading post. Then
trading at that post will not be suﬃcient to cover the ﬁx e dc o s t ,a n ds ot h ea g e n tw i l l
have no incentive to bring a currency to buy or sell at that trading post. In this case, the
trading post will remain inactive.
2.3. Timing of Events
The timing of events is as follows. At the beginning of a period, agents receive unspent
cash balances in each currency. They receive their income from last period sales of their
endowment, in their own currency, plus a currency transfer from the monetary authorities.
In total, this leaves them mijt. Agents then visit the trading posts of their choice in
4In reality of course, currency traders do not just trade one currency for another. But there are clear
limits on the number of exchange possibilities that exist. Few commercial currency exchanges are willing
to buy or sell much more than about a half dozen currencies. Moreover, bid ask spreads are typically
higher for smaller currencies. The use of trading posts allows us a simpliﬁed way to handle the frictions
inherent in currency trading.
5order to exchange currencies. After currency exchange at trading posts, they hold m0
ijt of
each currency. After the currency trading is over, they visit the goods market, with each
household dividing into a shopper and a seller. At the end of the period, the households
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We will suppress the time subscript t whenever possible and use the subscript ±z to
stand for t ± z,w h e r ez ≥ 1. Denote the (normalized) nominal exchange rate for a buyer
of currency j at a post kj as sa
kj. This is the normalized currency k ‘ask’ price of one unit
of currency j,a tt h ep o s tkj.5 Likewise, for a seller of currency j, at trading post kj,t h e
exchange rate is sb
kj, which is the ‘bid’ price of currency j in terms of currency k.C l e a r l y ,
sa
kj ≥ sb
kj is required for trading post kj to be viable.
Let f
kj
ik be the amount of currency k (normalized by the total stock of currency k)
brought to the post kj by the representative country i household. Because households
c a n n o ts h o r to nc u r r e n c i e sa ta n yp o s t ,f
kj
ik ≥ 0f o ra l li,k,j.6
3. Symmetric Trading Equilibrium
In this section, we describe a conﬁguration where there is a trading post open for all pairs
of currencies. In total, there are N(N − 1)/2 posts open. Households of each country can
then engage in direct currency trade in order to obtain the currency required to purchase
any country’s good. We describe an equilibrium of this setup as a Symmetric Trading
Equilibrium (STE).
3.1. Household Choices
Consider an arbitrary country i and let us examine the decision problem of a representa-
tive household in country i. For given money holdings, the household chooses a sequence
{hit}∞












, to maximize Ui sub-







ii(−1) − nipi(−1)cii(−1) + pi(−1)
i
+ τi (3.1)
5The normalization implies multiplying the nominal exchange rate by the currency j money stock, and
dividing by the currency k money stock. This means that permanent diﬀerences in money growth across
countries k and j do not aﬀect skj.






















,j 6= i, (3.2)
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ii ,i < j , (3.4)
m
0




ii ,i > j , (3.5)
m
0
ij ≥ njpjcij, all j. (3.6)
Equation (3.1) describes the dynamics of domestic cash balances and (3.2) the dynamics
of the balances of foreign currencies. For the domestic currency, holdings at the beginning
of the period consist of left-over currency in the last period, sales of goods in the last period,
or monetary transfers. Note that the household spends nipicii on all domestic goods (where
pi is the normalized price of good i), but receives income only from its own endowment pi.
Money growth γi is applied to the money carried over from the last period because m0
ii(−1)
and pi(−1) are normalized by last period’s money stock. For a foreign currency j 6= i,
holdings at the beginning of the period consist entirely of the left-over currency in the last
period, as described in (3.2).
The household then visits the N − 1 currency trading posts ij (for i<j )a n dji (for




ii to these posts, as described in (3.3). Recall
that m is measured immediately before currency trades and m0 is measured immediately
after currency trades. At the ij trading post (i<j ), the household pays the ‘ask’ price
for currency j, and receives f
ij
ii /sa
ij units of currency j in return. At the ji trading post




of currency j. These constraints are described in (3.4) and (3.5). In addition, the cash in
advance constraint (3.6) must be satisﬁed for all consumption of each country’s goods.
We ﬁrst examine the optimal choices of households, taking exchange rates as given, and
then look at equilibrium exchange rates which ensure that trading posts are viable in an
STE. To proceed, assume that all cash-in-advance constraints are binding.7 This means
that households have no foreign currency left over at the beginning of a period, and they
hold the entire stock of domestic currency. That is, mij =0f o ra l lj 6= i and so mii =1 /ni.
The households must visit all trading posts in order to ensure that they can consume all
goods.
In Appendix A, we show that optimal choices for household i give the conditions:
for j>i : s
a
ijpjcij = picii, (3.7)
for j<i : pjcij = s
b
jipicii. (3.8)
7Conditions under which this will be conﬁrmed are given below.
7Because the household holds no foreign currency across periods, consumption of a foreign
good j must be ﬁnanced entirely by the amount of currency j that the household purchases
in the current period. That is, f
ij
ii /sa
ij = njpjcij for j>i ,a n df
ji
ii sb
ji = njpjcij for
j<i . Also, all purchases of foreign currencies in the period must come from holdings
of domestic currency at the beginning of the period. Therefore, using (3.3) together with
these conditions, we get:
1
ni



























, j<i . (3.11)
Thus, households bring more of their total cash balances to trading posts oﬀering the
currency of larger countries.
3.2. Trading Posts and Exchange Rate Determination
There is a ﬁrm at each trading post ij.T h eﬁrm sets prices sa
ij and sb
ij so as to just break
even, after it incurs the ﬁxed cost φ in good i and φ in good j.T h eﬁrm must pay these
ﬁxed costs with currency. Hence, the ﬁrm must hold currency i in the (normalized) amount
piφ and currency j in the amount pjφ.
As a result, exchange rates in trading post ij must satisfy two conditions. The ﬁrst












This is explained as follows. In an STE, trading post ij receives total currency j payments
of njf
ij
jj (since only country j agents hold currency j at the beginning of each period in this
equilibrium), and must hold currency pjφ to pay the good j ﬁxed costs of setting up the
trading post. It receives nif
ij
ii deliveries of currency i from country i residents. It must set
the ask price of currency j that country i residents will pay so that its holdings of currency
j,i ne x c e s so fi t sﬁxed costs, are all paid out to country i households. From this condition,
sa
ij exactly satisﬁes this property.
In a similar manner, to determine the bid price, sb
ij, the trading post must satisfy
the condition that deliveries of currency i made by country i households, less required








ii − piφ. (3.13)
8From the fact that all cash in advance constraints bind, in conjunction with market
clearing, we have that mi =1=nipi,s ot h a tpi =1 /ni, for all i. Using this in (3.12) and
(3.13), and substituting the solutions for the currency trades f
ij












Bilateral (normalized) nominal exchange rates are proportional to the relative size of the
countries, adjusted for transactions costs. The bigger is country j relative to i,t h eg r e a t e r
is the total demand for currency j by country i residents, leading to a higher cost of j.W e
impose the restriction φ<n inj,f o ra l li,j, so that these solutions are meaningful.
The above results, together with (3.7) and (3.8), lead to the following statements: (a)














(b) Consumption levels under STE are:




,a l l j 6= i. (3.17)
The equilibrium bid-ask spread reﬂects the presence of trading costs. The bid-ask
spread will be higher, the smaller the countries i and j, since this implies that a smaller
volume of total currency is brought by both buyers and sellers to the ij trading post.
Of each type of good endowed to a country i, each domestic resident of the country
consumes one unit, and so total consumption of this good by domestic residents is ni (< 1).
In contrast, of each type of good endowed to a foreign country j (6= i), a resident of country
i consumes less than one unit and so total consumption of each foreign good by country i
r e s i d e n t si sl e s st h a nni. The presence of trading costs in the currency market introduces
an endogenous home bias in consumption. Given the form of preferences and the trading
cost technology, the STE has the property that the ﬁxed costs of setting up the ij trading
post are fully borne by households of country i and j.T h eﬁxed costs in terms of good j
(i) are borne by country i (j).8
How does country size aﬀect the outcome of the STE? From (3.17) above, we see that
consumption is higher if the trade involves a larger country. Take the example where
n1 = n,a n dni = n0 for all i>1( s i n c e
P
ni =1w em u s th a v en0 =( 1− n)/(N − 1)).
8To see how this is consistent with market clearing, note that for each individual good in country j there
is an amount 1 − (N − 1)φ/nj available for consumption, which is equal to the endowment less the cost




nicij. Substituting the solutions for consumption above, it can be established that this equals the
available endowment.
9Assume also that n1 >n 0. Hence, c1i = ci1 =1−
φ
n1n0 for i>1. In addition, c1i >c ij,
i,j > 1. Consumption is higher if the trade involves a larger country. Intuitively, c1j
is higher than cij, because country 1 has more residents sharing the ﬁxed good j cost of
setting up trading post 1j than country i has to share the ﬁxed good j cost of post ij.
Likewise, ci1 is higher than cij because the good 1 ﬁxed cost of setting up trading post 1i
is spread among more goods than the good j cost of setting up trading post ij (or ji,i f
i>j ). In this example, since c1j >c ij for all i,j > 1, we may also conclude that country 1
residents have higher welfare than other countries. Because of its size, country 1 receives
higher consumption of all other country’s goods, whereas all other countries receive higher
consumption of only country 1’s good.
Note that consumption in the STE is independent of home or foreign country money
growth. Money is neutral, and there are no international ‘spillovers’ of monetary policy.
Finally, we check that the cash in advance constraints indeed bind. Using the ﬁrst order
conditions above, it is easy to establish that cash in advance constraints for each currency
i will bind in a steady state if γi >β .
4. Currency 1 as a Vehicle
Now assume that currency 1 serves as the vehicle currency. In a VCE (Vehicle Currency
Equilibrium) currency 1 has active trading posts with all other currencies, but there are
no bilateral posts except those with currency 1. This reduces the total number of trading
posts from N(N −1)/2t oN −1. We call country 1 the VC country or the center country
and other countries the peripheral countries.
4.1. Households’ Decisions
In a VCE, residents of all other countries i>1 must engage in two foreign exchange
transactions in order to consume goods other than their own or country 1’s good. This
means that, from the time of their decision to consume an additional unit of these goods,
they must wait one period for consumption to take place. To obtain other peripheral
country currencies j 6= i,1, a household in a peripheral country i (6=1 )m u s tc a r r ya
positive amount of the vehicle currency between periods. That is, mi1 > 0 for all i 6=1 .
As a result, the total holdings of currency 1 by country 1 residents must be lower than
the entire stock of currency 1, i.e., m11 < 1/n1. Because the peripheral countries hold
currency 1 between two adjacent periods, the cash in advance constraint on currency 1
does not bind for these countries. In contrast, for the VC country, the cash in advance
constraint on currency 1 binds under the same conditions as in the STE. Also, as before,
the cash in advance constraints on all non-vehicle currencies bind for all countries. Thus,
mij =0f o ra l li 6= j and j 6=1 ,a n dmii =1 /ni for all i 6=1 .
The decision problem facing country 1 is identical to that described above, because
country 1 has active trading posts with all other countries. For country i>1, the dynamics
of money holdings are still given by (3.1) and (3.2), and the cash in advance constraints
10by (3.6). However, the other constraints are modiﬁed as follows:
m
0






























Constraint (4.1) says that the only domestic currency i that the household spends in
the currency market is that brought to the 1i post. The household’s holding of the vehicle
currency coming out of the foreign exchange market is described by (4.2). This comprises
its initial holding of vehicle currency mi1, less its purchases of other peripheral currencies,




i1 , plus new purchases of vehicle currency, sb
1if1i
ii .
The constraint (4.3) gives the household’s holdings of other non-vehicle currency j/ ∈ {1,i}
after the currency exchange. The household uses the vehicle currency to exchange for such
a non-vehicle currency at the 1j post, and the amount of the vehicle currency that the
household brings to the post is f
1j
i1 . Finally, (4.4) requires that the total amount of the
vehicle currency that the household brings into the ij posts should not exceed the amount
that the household has when it enters the period. We may call this constraint the ‘vehicle
currency constraint’. It prevents the household from short sales in vehicle currency, since
mi1 ≥ 0 must always hold. The vehicle currency constraint binds, provided γ1 >β .
In Appendix A, we show that the optimal choices of a peripheral country i household












pj(+1)cij(+1), j/ ∈ {i,1}. (4.6)
The condition (4.5) characterizes the trade-oﬀ between consuming good 1 and the domestic
good, which is the same as before. For each country i>1 ,t h er e l a t i v ep r i c eo fg o o d1
is p1/(sb
1ipi). But the trade-oﬀ involved between consumption of the domestic good and
another peripheral country good is quite diﬀerent. Sacriﬁcing one unit of the domestic
good gives pi in domestic currency, and hence sb
1ipi in currency 1 when converted at the 1i
trading post. This can only be converted into a country j’s (j/ ∈ {i,1}) currency in next
period’s foreign exchange trading session. In the next period, each dollar of currency 1
c a no b t a i n1 /[γ1(+1)sa
1j(+1)pj(+1)] units of good j. Equating the costs and beneﬁts in utility
terms, and discounting, gives condition (4.6).
There are three aspects of the vehicle currency equilibrium, relative to the STE, that
aﬀect the decisions of peripheral countries. First, to consume other peripheral goods, they
11must undertake two foreign exchange transactions, accepting the bid price of their own
currency i in terms of currency 1, and paying the ask price of currency j/ ∈ {1,i} in terms
of currency 1. Second, the transaction involves a delay, which is costly because agents
discount future utility. Finally, it also involves a cost due to country 1 money growth, as
country 1 inﬂation will reduce the real value of their currency 1 money holdings over time.
As in the previous section, only residents of country i 6= 1 hold currency i between
periods. Thus, mii =1 /ni and pi =1 /ni for all i 6= 1, as before. Also, a country i’s
holdings of currency i are equal to the sum of expenditures on goods. However, because
the expenditures on other peripheral countries’ goods occur with a one period delay, as
explained above, the condition (3.9) needs to be modiﬁed. In Appendix A, it is shown
that:



















































where δi ≡ ni + n1 + β(1 − ni − n1).
Expression (4.8) shows that for β<1, a peripheral country i consumes a higher share
of its own good than under STE, since trading oﬀ consumption of good i for good j/ ∈ {1,i}
involves waiting one period, and future consumption is discounted. Condition (4.9) says
that whatever country i (6= 1) does not spend on its home good, it brings to the 1i trading
post to obtain currency 1. For all feasible values of β the household brings a larger volume
of domestic currency to the 1i trading post under VCE than under STE. For instance, in
the case β =1 , the household spends a fraction ni of its total domestic money balances on
domestic goods, and brings the rest, 1 − ni,t ot h e1 i post.
Condition (4.10) gives the amount of currency 1 brought to the 1j trading post (j 6= i).
Recall that in the STE country i residents bring nj/ni of their own currency to the ij
trading post (i.e. condition 3.11). But in the VCE, the amount of currency 1 brought to
the 1j post by country i 6=1 ,j, will depend on discounting, country 1 money growth, and
the previous period’s bid rate at which currency i was sold. We can establish that (4.10)
is below nj/ni for all values of β ≤ 1a n dγ1 ≥ 1.
12The condition (4.11), which is just the sum over j of (4.10), gives the total amount of
currency 1 that country i holds at the beginning of the period.
For country 1, optimal consumption is chosen in the same manner as under the STE:
s
a
1ipic1i = p1c11,f o ri 6=1 . (4.12)
As a vehicle currency, currency 1 will be held by residents of all countries. This means
that, compared to the STE, it is no longer true that m11 =1 /n1.I nf a c t ,s i n c en1m11 +
P
i6=1 nimi1 = 1, using (4.11), it must be the case that normalized holdings of currency 1























, for i 6=1 . (4.14)
The amount of currency 1 brought to the 1i p o s tb yac o u n t r y1h o u s e h o l di s :
f
1i
11 = nim11, (4.15)
which must be less than the equivalent measure under STE, since m11 < 1/n1.
To compute the price level, p1, notice that the cash in advance constraint on currency
1 binds for country 1. Using this fact and the fact τ1 =( γ1 − 1)/γ1n1, we rewrite the






Thus, country 1’s normalized price level is inﬂuenced by the holdings of currency 1 by all
other countries.
4.2. Trading Posts with a Vehicle Currency
We now determine exchange rates under the VCE. In each period, country i residents in
total bring nif1i
ii to the 1i post. At the 1i post, currency 1 is supplied by country 1, in
the amount n1f1i
11, and by each of the other peripheral countries j/ ∈ {i,1}, in the amount
njf1i




























j1 − p1φ. (4.18)
We focus on a steady state where γ1 is constant over time. Then, all real variables and
all normalized nominal variables are constant over time. In the steady state, the above
conditions in the currency market and the condition (4.13) yield the following proposition:
13Proposition 4.1. Under the VCE, ask and bid exchange rates for trading posts 1i, i>1,
may be written as:
s
bV CE




(δi − ni)[Di − (1 − n1m11)Ei]+p1φ































δi − ni +( β/γ1)ni
.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The solutions (4.19) and (4.20) require knowledge of m11 and p1. From (4.13) and
(4.19) we can calculate m11 as given by:
1 − n1m11 =
P
i6=1(1 − ni − n1)Di
γ1/β +
P
i6=1(1 − ni − n1)Ei
. (4.21)
Then, (4.16) determines p1.
The full expressions for sbV CE
1i and saV CE
1i are quite complicated. In order to develop
the intuition behind the solutions, we begin by focusing on some special cases.
4.3. Some Special Cases
Case A: {n =1 /N, γ1 =1 ,β→ 1}. In this case, all countries are of equal size, country
1 money growth is zero, and the discount factor tends to unity. For this case, the only
diﬀerence in the opportunity set of peripheral country agents and residents of the VC is
that the former must engage in indirect trading.
Since countries are of equal size, SbV CE
1i and SaV CE
1i are independent of i.T h e nw ec a n
write (4.17) as:
s


























The ﬁrst line is explained as follows. The supply of peripheral currency i to the 1i trading
post originates with the demand of country i households for non-i goods, which equals their
money holdings nimii (= 1) times the measure of non-i goods, which is 1−ni =( N−1)/N.
14Country i sellers then receive the bid price sbV CE
1i per unit of currency. The demand for
currency i comes from residents of country 1 and country j/ ∈ {1,i}. First, country 1
residents’ total nominal demand for goods is n1m11 = m11/N, and thus their demand
for country i goods is nin1m11 = m11/N 2. Second, residents of each peripheral country
j/ ∈ {1,i} exchange currency 1 for currency i. In total, the amount of currency 1 held by
peripheral countries is equal to 1−m11/N, so the amount per country is (1−m11/N)/(N−
1). An amount 1/(N −2) of this is spent on currency i,b u tt h e r ea r eN −2s u c hc o u n t r i e s .
Hence, (1 − m11/N)/(N − 1) represents the total spending on currency i coming from
peripheral countries. However, the supply of currency 1 to the 1i market is reduced by the
amount p1φ, which is the amount of currency 1 that needs to be held by the 1i trading
post manager, to cover the ﬁxed cost of setting up the post.
The second line of (4.22) comes from expanding the deﬁnitions of m11 and p1 from (4.13)
and (4.16). Note that there is a simultaneity here in that both the supply and demand
for peripheral currency depends on the equilibrium bid price under VCE. Intuitively, the
equilibrium bid price determines how much of currency 1 can be taken on to the next
trading post.




(N − 2)(N − 1)(1 − φN2)/N +1
. (4.23)
This exchange rate is lower than (3.14). Thus the VCE equilibrium pushes down exchange
rates for the peripheral countries. Both the demand and supply for currency i at the
trading post 1i rise in the VCE, relative to the STE. But demand rises by less than supply,
since the increase in the demand for i by peripheral countries (bringing currency 1 from
last period) is partly oﬀset by a lower demand for i from the residents of country 1, the
vehicle currency country, given that their money holdings are lower.








N − 1 − N2φ
N − 1 − (N − 2)N2φ
> 1 − N
2φ.
Comparing (4.24) with (3.15), we see that the bid-ask spread is lower under the case A
VCE than under the STE, for all feasible values of φ. Intuitively, greater trade volume on
both sides of the foreign exchange market pushes down spreads.
Case B: {n =1 /N}. This case is more general than Case A. While the case restricts
all countries to be of equal size, it leaves the discount factor and the rate of country 1













´ β(N − 2) + 1 − β(N − 2)Nφ1
³
N − 1+ 1
γ1
´
[β(N − 2) + 2 − (β(N − 2) + 2)N2φ]
< 1.
Note that Ω0
B(γ1) > 0. Again, the bid-ask spread is smaller than under STE, but the
spread is increasing in money growth. Higher country 1 money growth reduces a peripheral
country’s currency deliveries to each trading post in a VCE, thus reducing trading volume
and bidding up spreads. But it is still the case that limγ1→∞ ΩB(γ1) < 1. Money growth
can not generate a spread higher than that in the STE.
4.4. Eﬃciency and Resource Allocation with a Vehicle Currency
The VCE reduces the resources needed to operate the exchange, relative to STE, and
hence raises available world resources for consumption. Each peripheral country now sets
up just one trading post. With less resources used up in trading posts, there are more of all
goods i>1 available for consumption, and the same amount of good 1. For large N,t h i s
eﬃciency gain can be substantial. But at the same time, the vehicle currency introduces
an asymmetry into the allocation of world resources. In this section, we analyze the nature
of the global gains from a vehicle currency, as well as the asymmetric gains achieved by
the vehicle currency country.
Again, we begin with some special cases.
Case A: {n =1 /N, γ1 =1 , β → 1}
In this case, the eﬃciency gains from the VCE are easy to illustrate. In the STE, each
c o u n t r y ’ sn e to u t p u to fe a c ho fi t sg o o d si s1−φN(N −1) (the endowment less the cost of
setting up N − 1 trading posts, divided by the number of goods in the country; 1/N). In
a VCE, net output of each centre country good is unchanged, since it must set up N − 1
trading posts still. But output of each good of each peripheral country is now 1 − φN,
since only one trading post is set up, for each country.
Although output of each peripheral country good is larger, the beneﬁts of the VCE go
disproportionately to VC country residents. For Case A, we may show that:
c
VCE
11 =1 , (4.26)
c
VCE
1i = ΩA (N) ≥ 1,i>1, (4.27)
where ΩA is deﬁned following (4.24). Country 1’s consumption of the home good is the
same as in STE. Consumption of all other country’s goods diﬀers from (3.17), however. It
is easy to see that cVCE
1i >c STE
1i . Moreover, from (4.27), ΩA(3) = 1, and Ω0
A(N) > 0, so
that cVCE
1i ≥ 1. Since c11 is unchanged, and c1i is higher, the VC country is unambiguously
better oﬀ than in the STE.
For the peripheral countries, we may establish that:
c
VCE
ii =1 ( 4 . 2 8 )
c
VCE




ij =( 1− φN
2)ΩA(N). (4.30)
For the peripheral country, consumption of the domestic good and country 1 good is the
same as in the STE. Consumption of other peripheral countries diﬀers however. From
(4.30), since (1 −φN2) < 1, we must have cVCE
ij <c VCE
1j ,i>1,i6= j.T h u s ,t h eg a i nf r o m
VCE for peripheral countries is lower than that of the VC country. Comparing (4.29) and
(4.30) with (4.26) and (4.27), we can see that in equilibrium, all the transactions costs of
setting up trading posts are borne by the peripheral countries. Thus the good 1 cost of
setting up the 1i trading post is borne by country i, given (4.29), and cVCE
11 =1 . B u t
also, the good j cost of the 1j trading post is borne by country i, given (4.30). In fact,
since ΩA(N) > 1, for N>3, the VC country consumes more than the average endowment
of peripheral goods, so that in a VCE, the peripheral countries incur more than the full
amount of the transactions costs.
Does this mean that peripheral countries are worse oﬀ? The answer is no, because,
while they bear all the transactions costs, the overall transactions costs are far lower in
VCE than in STE, and the transactions cost saving is increasing in N. From (4.30), we
know that cVCE
ij ≥ cSTE





i1 ,a n df o rN =3 ,c VCE
ij = cSTE
ij , then for the case of three countries, peripheral
countries are exactly as well oﬀ in VCE as in STE. But for N>3, cVCE
ij >c STE
ij ,a n d
welfare is higher under VCE.
The higher is N, the greater is the transaction cost saving due to the vehicle currency.
Country 1’s consumption of peripheral goods may be written as cVCE
1i = p1/(sa
1ipi)c11.
Since c11 is constant in this special case, a rise in cVCE
1i is equivalent to country 1 receiving
a higher terms of trade, or a lower relative price of the peripheral good. We may write
p1/(sa
1ipi)=ΩA(N). This is greater than the analogous price under STE, which is 1−φN2.




1jpj)cii.S i n c e cii is constant, the increase in consumption of other
peripheral country goods, relative to the STE, comes about only if there is a fall in their
relative price, (sa
1jpj)/sb
1ipi.I nc a s eA ,sb
1ipi/(sa
1jpj)=( 1− φN2)ΩA(N) ≥ 1 − φN2.T h u s ,
the existence of a vehicle currency eﬀectively improves the terms of trade for all countries.
Nevertheless, the gains for country 1 exceed those for peripheral countries. Country 1 has
to trade only once in order to consume any good, while peripheral countries must trade
twice. Even without time discounting or money growth, this leads the terms of trade gains
to be lower for the peripheral country, relative to the VC country. In addition, as we have
noted, for N =3 ,all the gains go to the VC country.
Case C: {γ1 =1 ,β→ 1,n 1 = n, ni =( 1− n)/(N − 1),i>1}.
We use this case to illustrate how the level and distribution of welfare gains from a
VCE change with the VC country’s size. In this case, country 1 can have a diﬀerent size
from peripheral countries. For instance, if n>1/N,t h e nni < 1/N for all i>1, which
implies that the VC country is larger than all peripheral countries.





ii ,a n dcVCE
i1 = cSTE
i1 , i>1, as in case A. So again, VCE only makes a
diﬀerence for consumption of peripheral country goods for country 1, and consumption of
17non-domestic peripheral goods for the countries i>1. Solving, we ﬁnd that:
c
VCE















(1 − n)(n + N − 2)
#, "
1 − φ
(N − 1)(N − 2)
n(n + N − 2)
#
.
We may use these solutions to construct the values cVCE
1j − cSTE
1j ,a n dcVCE
ij − cSTE
ij ,
measuring the degree to which the VC country and the peripheral countries gain from the
















n(n+N−2) < 1. Under the feasibility condition φ
(N−1)
(1−n)n < 1, this diﬀerence in
consumption is always positive. Thus, the VC country always gains, whatever its relative
size.











[n(n + N − 2)(1 − φρ)] > 0.
It is possible to have cVCE
ij <c STE
ij . If this occurs, then peripheral countries must lose as
a result of the VCE. Take the case N = 3 as an example. Recall that in case A, with
N =3( a n dn =1 /N), then cVCE
ij −cSTE
ij =0 .B u th e r e ,w i t hN = 3, the expression inside
the square parentheses is n(3n − 1) < 0, so if n<1/3wehavecVCE
ij − cSTE
ij < 0, and the
peripheral country is worse oﬀ in the VCE. The intuition is easy to see. In the case N =3
before, the peripheral countries were indiﬀerent between the VC and STE. The costs of
indirect trade were just oﬀset by the gains from shutting down trading posts. But with
N =3a n dn<1/3, the costs of indirect trade exceed the gains from fewer trading posts,
since using the vehicle currency involves trading through a smaller market with higher
transactions costs. Thus, a VCE where the vehicle currency country is smaller than the
average sized country may reduce welfare for peripheral countries.
We may also explore the way in which the gains from the VCE change in response to












¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
n=1/N
> 0.
18Thus, the consumption gains for the VC country are negatively related to its size. In
the STE, a rise in country 1’s size has a large eﬀect on country 1’s consumption of all
goods j>1, as described in above. But in the VCE, the increase in country 1’s size has
a smaller impact, because each trading post has more currency j on the other side. A
marginal increase in the size of the vehicle currency economy has a diluted impact on its
consumption of other goods in the VCE relative to STE.
By contrast, for peripheral countries, the gain goes in the opposite direction. A rise
in the relative size of country 1 will reduce cSTE
ij , since each peripheral country becomes
relatively smaller. But in the VCE, the negative impact of a rise in n is diminished, because
country i is purchasing country j’s good via the 1i and 1j currency markets. Hence, while
the VC country size tends to lower gains for the VC country itself, it will raise gains for
peripheral countries.
Case D: {β → 1,n= ni =1 /N}.
We use this case to examine the impact of country 1 money growth, again assuming no
time discounting, and all countries being of equal size. We may derive the consumption of




N[1 + (γ1 − 1)(N − 1)(1 − φ(N − 2))]




1j =[ 1+( γ1 − 1)(N − 1)(1 − φ(N − 2))]ΩD(γ1). (4.34)
where
ΩD(γ1)=




N−1 (γ1(N − 1) + 1)
.
Country 1 money growth aﬀects allocations in the VCE because it represents a tax on
peripheral country holders of currency 1. Both cVCE
11 and cVCE
1j from (4.33) and (4.34) are
increasing in γ1, although Ω0
D(γ1) < 0. Since, under STE, allocations are independent of
monetary policy, clearly the gains to VCE for country 1 are increasing in γ1.
Analogously, we can derive the consumption for peripheral countries under VCE as:
cii =1 , (4.35)
ci1 =
(1 − φN2)γ1N
N(2γ1 − 1) + 2(1 − γ1)
, (4.36)
cij =( 1− φN
2)ΩD(γ1). (4.37)
Country 1 money growth reduces peripheral country consumption of both good 1 and all
other peripheral country goods. From (4.37), we see that limγ1→∞ cij = 0, since country
1i n ﬂation progressively erodes the usefulness of the vehicle currency in exchange. Then
consumption of good j goes only to residents of country j and country 1. We note also
that, even though the ﬁnancing for consumption of good 1 does not require peripheral
19country residents to hold currency 1 over time, their consumption of the vehicle currency
good is eroded by money growth in the vehicle currency country. This happens because
higher money growth reduces the demand for currency i>1c o m i n gf r o mr e s i d e n t so fa l l
other peripheral countries, since it reduces the value of these agents currency 1 holdings.
This pushes down the exchange rate that country i residents receive in the 1i trading post,
reducing their terms of trade. In this way, money growth has both a direct and an indirect
eﬀect on peripheral country welfare.
Case D assumes β → 1. In fact, the results just illustrated hold for general β ≤ 1,
but are more cumbersome to show. Nevertheless, we may state the following proposition,
w h i c hi sp r o v e di nA p p e n d i xB .
Proposition 4.2. Under the assumption that ni = n =1 /N, i > 1,t h eV C Es a t i s ﬁes the
following features: (i) sa
1i/sb
1i is increasing in γ1; (ii) ci1 (i 6=1 ) is decreasing in γ1,b u tcii
is independent of γ1; (iii) cij (j 6= i,1) is decreasing in γ1;( i v )c11 is increasing in γ1;( v )
c1i is increasing in γ1.
4.5. Welfare Comparison
We now move to the general model, taking into account money growth, country size, time
discounting, and variation in the number of countries. We examine the welfare gains from
a vehicle currency, relative to the STE. We calibrate the model as follows. Although it is
reasonable to assume that the carrying time period of vehicle currency is relatively small,
the function of a vehicle currency extends across a number of diﬀerent frequencies.9 We
set β =0 .99, to match a quarterly trading frequency. The value of the gross money growth
rate γ1 is taken from the US CPI growth rate over 1980-2006, which was 0.9 percent at a
quarterly frequency. Thus we set γ1 =1 .009.
There is a large literature on the measurement of transactions costs involved in foreign
exchange trading. In Emerson et al. (1992), estimates of the gains to a single currency in
E u r o p e ,u s i n gas u r v e yo fd i ﬀerent measurement approaches, suggested that the reduction
in transactions costs would be 0.4 percent of EU GDP. More direct estimates of transactions
costs have been obtained from observed bid-ask spreads (e.g. Glassman, 1987). Bid-ask
spreads in large foreign exchange markets are typically much smaller, in the order of .08
percent (e.g. Huang and Stoll, 1997). Aliber et al. (2000) criticize the use of bid-ask
spreads and instead argue for using quoted data from foreign exchange futures. Their
estimate of the equivalent transaction cost is 0.05 percent.
9This represents a compromise between diﬀerent perspectives on the use of a vehicle currency. For
some ﬁnancial traders, the holding period of currency might be hours or days, while for other exporters or
importers using vehicle currency to facilitate ongoing transactions, the time period would be signiﬁcantly
longer. More generally however, the need to hold either vehicle currency cash or liquid assets in order to
facilitate trade might impose a cost over a much longer horizon. Since our model is based on currency use for
commodity trade, we use a quarterly frequency. With much higher frequencies, the model implies that VC
inﬂation rates can be very high without aﬀecting the usefulness of the vehicle currency. The quantitative
estimates of the beneﬁts of a vehicle currency, relative to STE, are not sensitive to the frequency chosen,
however.
20From our perspective, the use of observed bid-ask spreads to measure transactions
costs may be misleading. In our model, average transactions costs depend on volume, and
hence on whether a vehicle currency exists. Because foreign exchange markets are already
dominated by a vehicle currency, bid-ask spreads from such markets are not likely to give
an adequate measure of the costs that would be borne in alternative trading structures.
Given this uncertainty, we report results for a range of alternative values of φ, beginning
with a basemark value for φ implied by the lowest of the above estimates, i.e. φ =0 .0005.
We also report results for a range of values of N, the number of countries, and n,t h e
relative size of the vehicle currency country. Following case C above, we assume that all
peripheral countries are of equal size, so that ni =( 1− n)/(N − 1), for all i =2 ,...,N.
We compare the allocations received under the VCE with those of the STE. Deﬁne the





ij for all i,j ∈ {1,2,...,N}. (4.38)
As a welfare measure we compute the uniform increase in the consumption of all goods
that an agent would require, in the STE, to make her indiﬀerent between STE and VCE.
We denote this as dci, and compute this separately for agents of country 1 and country






where the weights ni on individual country utility reﬂect the population of each country.
Changes in UW are translated into uniform increases in world consumption, which we
denote dcW.
Figures 1a and 1b illustrate the relative consumption ratios r11,r 1j,r i1,r ii, and rij,
i,j > 1,i6= j. The horizontal axis depicts the relative size of the VC country. The
Figures assumes N = 10. Therefore, n =0 .1 represents a symmetric point where all
countries are of equal size. For n>0.1( n<0.1), country 1 is relatively larger (smaller)
than all other countries. The Figure shows that the main eﬀects of a vehicle currency
are to increase consumption of peripheral country goods, both by country 1 and by other
peripheral countries. At the symmetric point n =0 .1, c1j (j>1) is 16 percent higher
under the VCE than in the STE, while cij (i 6= j, i, j > 1) is 3 percent higher. c11 is 6
percent higher than under STE. By contrast, cii is only slightly higher, since this diﬀers
across equilibria only due to time discounting (see 4.8), and the discount factor is very
close to unity in this calibration. ci1 is slightly lower under VCE relative to STE.10
Figure 1 also illustrates the impact of the relative size of country 1. As country 1 gets
larger relative to the rest of the world, both c11 and c1j fall, while cij rises. Thus, country
1 tends to lose, as it gets larger, while peripheral countries tend to gain. This is consistent
with the discussion above. Under the STE, a rise in n involves a fall in the relative size of
the periphery, which raises average cost of trading and reduces the gains from trade with
one another. By contrast, trading through the large vehicle country currency involves a
10Output of good 1 in a VCE is lower than that of peripheral countries, because good 1 is used to cover
transactions costs for N-1 trading posts, while good i>1i sj u s tu s e df o r1p o s t .
21gain via a reduction in average trading costs, a n dt h i sg a i ni sg r e a t e r ,t h el a r g e ri st h e
vehicle currency country.
Figure 2 translates the results directly into welfare equivalent measures. The vertical
axis represents the consumption beneﬁto ft h eV C E ,dci, for country 1, and for the periph-
eral countries, and for a measure of average world utility given by (4.39). For the baseline
calibration with N =1 0a n dn =0 .1, the welfare gains to a vehicle currency are heavily
weighted towards the centre country. It gains the equivalent of 15 percent of consumption,
while the peripheral country gains represent only 3 percent of consumption. But the gains
are very sensitive to country size. If the centre country is larger - say n = .25 (approxi-
mately the US share of world GDP), then the welfare gains are much closer - 5 percent for
country 1 and 3.2 percent for the peripheral countries. As n rises above 0.3, the gains for
peripheral countries exceed those of the VC.
Figure 2 is based on a highly conservative estimate of the transaction cost of inter-
national currency exchange. If we use a higher estimate (based on the bid-ask spreads
measured in Huang and Stoll (1998)) of φ =0 .001, the welfare gains to a vehicle currency
are much larger. Note that this is still a very small transaction cost, one tenth of 1 percent
of GDP. Figure 3 shows the results using this estimate. In the baseline case of n =0 .1, the
centre country consumption gain is 24 percent, and the peripheral countries gain 5 percent.
If in this case we use the higher estimate of n =0 .25, then the peripheral countries gain
exceeds that of the centre country.
These welfare gains are extremely large, relative to standard estimates of gains from
the public ﬁnance literature.11 What accounts for the large size of the beneﬁts? The
key feature of the VCE is that, for a relatively large number of countries, it leads to a
dramatic reduction in the number of trading posts, and hence greatly reduces the overall
costs of transactions. With N = 10, and n =0 .1, in the STE each country must set up
N − 1 trading posts. The costs of setting up a trading post must be recouped equally
from each agent’s endowment, so the total cost undergone per agent is φ(N −1)/ni.W i t h
ni = n =1 /N, this means that output of each good in country i is (1 − φ(N − 1)N).
For the calibration used in Figures 1 and 2, this implies that trading costs reduce output
by 2.7 percent. By contrast, in the VCE, for a peripheral country, only one trading post
must be formed. Output per good then is (1−φN), and transactions costs reduce output
by only 0.3 percent. Even though individual transactions costs are very small, the overall
cost can be very large when summed across a large number of bilateral trading posts. The
aggregate welfare beneﬁts are then obviously tied directly to the size of φ and the number
of countries.
Figure 4 follows through on this logic. We illustrate the welfare gains as a function of the
number of countries, N,a s s u m i n ge q u a lc o u n t r ys i z e ,s ot h a tn =1 /N, using the baseline
estimates for all other parameters. From the discussion above, we know that peripheral
countries do not beneﬁt at all if there is zero discounting, zero money growth, and N =3 .
Thus, for N =3 ,β<1, and γ1 > 1, peripheral countries are worse oﬀ in a VCE. Thus,
11Note however that the counterfactual involved is not necessarily equivalent to a policy change, since
the move from STE to VCE is not chosen by governments. In addition, we could argue that the STE
allocation is not a historically observed outcome.
22in the baseline calibration, peripheral countries only gain from a VCE if N is above a
critical level. For Figure 3, a vehicle country is beneﬁcial to the peripheral countries only
for N ≥ 6. But then as N rises above this, the welfare gains rise exponentially. While
the eﬃciency gains from a vehicle currency are clearly higher for large N, an interesting
feature of these gains is that for peripheral countries, the gains may not be monotonic in
N. Figure 4 illustrates this eﬀect by showing the gains to VCE for a higher rate of country
1i n ﬂation. In this case, country 1 gains are higher, not surprisingly. But also, for small N,
peripheral country gains may be falling in N initially. The intuition for this negative eﬀect
of N is that increasing the number of countries makes each country more open, because it
consumes approximately 1−1/N of total goods as imports. This means that in the VCE,
it is more exposed to the inﬂation tax of country 1, while in the STE this has no eﬀect.
Hence, beginning at N =3 ,a ni n c r e a s ei nN may reduce welfare for a peripheral country
initially, relative to STE. But as N rises further, the beneﬁts of reduced transactions costs
take over, and the gains are increasing in N.
Note that while the VCE oﬀers welfare gains for the world economy, the distribution
of gains depends on the money growth rate of country 1. Figure 5 illustrates the gains in
the baseline calibration, except setting γ1 = 1. In this case the gain to each peripheral
country is larger, and the gain to the VC country falls from 15 percent to 9 percent. Thus
6 percent of the welfare gain in the baseline case is due to the monetary policy followed by
the VC. Note that the overall world welfare gain is relatively independent of γ1.T h eg a i n
for the VC country is oﬀset closely by the losses to peripheral countries.
How high can γ1 increase before it eliminates the gains for the peripheral countries?
This will depend upon both N and n. For a large number of countries, and a VC country
which is large relative to others, there are still gains to a vehicle currency even for high
rates of VC money growth. Figure 6 shows the gains to peripheral countries, for various
levels of γ1.W h e n n =0 .1 (VC country equal size), peripheral gains from the VC are
eliminated at γ1 =1 .036. But if n =0 .2, there are still gains to peripheral countries
for γ1 < 1.044. Thus, VC country inﬂation rates can be very high before eliminating the
welfare gains to a vehicle currency.
Nevertheless, the above result raises questions about the degree to which the VCE
itself is sustainable in face of high centre country money growth. Moreover, in assessing
the beneﬁts to a vehicle currency, there is a clear trade-oﬀ between the rate of inﬂation
in the VC country and the size of the VC country. In the next section, we explore the
question of sustainability of a vehicle currency, and show how it relates to this trade-oﬀ.
5. Robustness of the Vehicle Currency Equilibrium
We have shown that there may be large welfare gains to a vehicle currency equilibrium.
B u tw ed i dn o ts h o wh o wav e h i c l ec u r r e n c ya r ises, or which currency will play the role
of a vehicle currency. Because of the trading technology and the existence of ﬁxed costs,
there are many equilibria in the model. Such multiplicity is inevitable when there are ﬁxed
costs of organizing the currency exchange. If some bilateral markets are not open, then
no individual trading ﬁrm has an incentive to incur a ﬁxed cost in order to trade in that
23market, since, with no customers, it will perceive that there are no proﬁts to be gained.
This multiplicity is robust to the reﬁnements of trembling hands by a small measure of
agents or of evolutionary stability.12
Given this characteristic of trading posts technologies with ﬁxed costs, we must explore
the robustness of a vehicle currency equilibrium through alternative approaches than the
standard evaluation of Nash equilibria. In order for a deviation from any equilibrium to
have aggregate consequences, it must be undertaken by a large number of agents. In this
section we examine whether the VC equilibrium is robust to deviations undertaken by all
agents within a country. One way to think of this national deviation is as an implicit policy
choice by national governments.
We focus on two types of deviations from a VCE. First, we examine the impact of a
bilateral deviation, in which all households in two countries choose to trade their currencies
directly, but maintain the use of the vehicle currency in trading with all other countries.
We then evaluate a deviation in which all households in all peripheral countries switch to
using a diﬀerent currency as the vehicle currency.
5.1. Bilateral Deviations
Let us ﬁrst consider a bilateral deviation by two countries, say, country 2 and country 3.
Suppose that all households in the two countries deviate to trade their own two currencies
directly. Other countries do not participate in the 23 post. Moreover, countries 2 and 3
still supply their domestic currencies to trade for currency 1 and use currency 1 to get
other peripheral currencies. However, country 2 does not use currency 1 to buy currency
3, and country 3 does not use currency 1 to buy currency 2.
Denote I = {1,2,3}. For a country i/ ∈ I, the decision problem is the same as in the
VCE characterized in the previous section, because all currency posts which the country
participated before are still active after the above deviation. Since the decision problems
of a household in country 2 and of a household in country 3 are images of one another, we
only formulate the problem for country 2.
With the deviation, a household in country 2 faces the following constraints involving
currencies 1, 2 and 3:
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12For example, if a small measure of agents from any two countries exchange their domestic currencies
directly in the VCE constructed above, they will make a loss as the amount of currencies brought into that
post will not be suﬃcient to cover the ﬁxed trading cost. Similarly, if a small measure of agents deviate
to using a diﬀerent currency as the vehicle currency, they will make a loss.
24Other constraints that the household faces, such as the cash in advance constraints in the
goods markets, are the same as those in the previous section.
Because country 2 still needs currency 1 to exchange for other non-I currencies, the cash
in advance constraint on currency 1 in the goods market does not bind for country 2, as














As before, m22 =1 /n2, mj2 =0( j 6=1 ,2), and p2 =1 /n2. Adding up country 2’s spending







2 = n2+n1+n3+β(1−n1−n2−n3). The household’s consumption levels of other
goods can be calculated accordingly. Also, for j/ ∈ I, the household’s optimal decisions on
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The bid-ask spread at the 23 post is smaller than that in the STE, provided N>3. This is
because, when β<1, countries 2 and 3 will assign a higher fraction of their budget to each
other’s good than they will to other peripheral country goods, given that the consumption
of those other goods requires a delay in consumption.
In the analysis below, j/ ∈ I unless it is speciﬁed otherwise. To compute exchange rates
at the 12 post and the 13 post after the deviation by countries 2 and 3, we count the total
25amount of currency 1 that is held by the peripheral countries at the beginning of a period
as follows:


































j1 − p1φ. (5.6)






































i1 − p1φ. (5.8)
These equations determine the exchange rate at each post involving currency 1.
Is the deviation proﬁtable for countries 2 and 3? In general, in order to assess this
question we need to compare utility levels in a deviating equilibrium, relative to the VCE.
But in the special case where β → 1, and γ1 = 1, we may use the property that a bilateral
deviation by countries 2 and 3 leaves unchanged both the relative prices and consumption
of all goods i/ ∈ {2,3}by all countries i =1 ,...,N. This means that in assessing the beneﬁts
from a deviation to a bilateral trade for countries 2 and 3, we can simply look at the change
in consumption of goods 2 and 3. Moreover, from (5.3) and (5.4), note that evaluated at
β =1 , the bilateral exchange rates between currencies 2 and 3 are identical to those in the
STE. This means that in the case β → 1, and γ1 =1 ,cDEV
23 = cSTE
23 .T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t
the conditions under which a bilateral deviation by countries 2 and 3 is beneﬁcial to these
countries are equivalent to the conditions that welfare of the peripheral countries under
VCE is lower than that under STE (again in case β → 1, and γ1 =1 ) .
We may summarize this in the following proposition:
Proposition 5.1. In the case β → 1 and γ1 =1 , there are no gains to deviating to a
bilateral trading arrangement when n ≥ 1/N.W h e ni na d d i t i o nt on ≥ 1/N, N>3,t h e
deviating countries are strictly worse oﬀ.
Again, we note that this condition may fail when n is too small, for the same reason that
the VCE may lead to lower welfare than under STE. In addition, the result implies that,
under this case, when considering a bilateral deviation, each country’s welfare calculation
is exactly aligned with average welfare for all peripheral countries. A bilateral deviation is
only desirable individually when it is desirable in the aggregate.
26To gain another perspective on the eﬀect of a bilateral deviation, we can compare the
direct exchange of currency 2 for currency 3 and the indirect exchange through the vehicle
currency. With the direct exchange, a household in country 2 gets 1/sa
23 units of currency
3 for each unit of currency 2. With the indirect exchange, one unit of currency 2 returns
sb
12 units of currency 1 in the current period, which the household can use to exchange
for sb
12/sa
13 next period. In the absence of discounting and money growth, the indirect
exchange through the vehicle currency gives a higher payoﬀ to a household in country 2






13 > 1. It turns out that
this condition holds if and only if the gain from VC is negative.13
In the more general case where β<1a n dγ1 ≥ 1, a bilateral deviation has implications
for consumption of all goods. Moreover, individual incentives are no longer aligned with
aggregate welfare. But even then, the main impact of a bilateral deviation is on the
consumption of the goods of the deviating countries, by the deviating countries themselves,
and if γ1 is large, by the VC country, since in the latter case, a deviation implies that it
loses some inﬂation tax revenue. For the deviating countries, the switch to bilateral trade
reduces the inﬂation tax embodied in trade using the vehicle currency, and as a result,
consumption of the deviating partners good may rise, so long as n is relatively small.
But if country 1 is large enough, the beneﬁt from avoiding the inﬂation tax is oﬀset by
the higher transactions costs of trading bilaterally, relative to going through the cheaper
vehicle currency.
Figure 7 illustrates the welfare gains from remaining in VCE, relative to a bilateral
deviation, for the deviating countries. This is compared to the general welfare gain from
t h eV C E ,r e l a t i v et oS T E ,a sc a l c u l a t e di nt h eprevious section. Under the calibration
behind the Figure, we see that there is no gain to a deviation for any value of n shown
in the Figure, even if country 1 is disproportionately small relative to other countries.14
Likewise, as we saw above, there is a positive aggregate welfare gain to a VCE relative to
STE.
We saw in the previous section that the threshold quarterly rate of inﬂation which
eliminates the gain to the VCE for equal size countries was 3.6 percent. But the analogous
threshold for a bilateral deviation is substantially lower. The reason is that two countries
individually can pursue a bilateral deviation and avoid the inﬂation tax in their mutual
trade, without giving up the beneﬁts of a vehicle currency in trading with all other coun-
tries. Thus, at any value for n and N, the maximum value of γ1 that eliminates a bilateral
deviation is smaller than the value that eliminates gains from a vehicle currency for all the
peripheral countries together. Figure 8 illustrates this relationship in the form of a trade-
oﬀ between γ1 and n that just eliminates the incentive to undertake a bilateral deviation
from VCE, and the analogous trade oﬀ for values that just eliminate gains from a VCE to
the peripheral countries. Take the case where the VC country is 25 percent of world GDP.
13This partial equilibrium assessment is appropriate only in the case where β → 1a n dγ1 =1 . W h e n
these conditions do not apply, then the bilateral deviation will change bid-ask spreads on bilateral trades
other than the 23 trade.
14Note that there is always a value for n small enough to warrant a bilateral deviation. For this Figure,
in order to gain from a deviation, we need n<0.006.
27Then the peripheral countries still gain from the VC even for (quarterly) inﬂation rates of
5 percent. But in order to avoid a bilateral deviation, inﬂation rates must be no higher
than 3 percent.
5.2. The Introduction of the Euro
The discussion above showed that when countries are of equal size, an increase in the
number of countries implies that each individual country specializes in a narrower range of
goods, which increases the costs of bilateral trade, thereby increasing the gains to a vehicle
currency. This discussion was based on the assumption of a one-to-one relationship between
currencies and countries. But if some countries join a single currency area, then the number
of currencies as measured by N will fall, and the economic size of the currency area will
equal the sum of the measure of goods produced in the member countries. What impact
does this have on the incentives of peripheral countries who remain outside the currency
area to engage in a bilateral deviation from currency 1 as a vehicle currency? This relates
to the question of the sustainability of the US dollar as an international currency in the
presence of the euro, as discussed in the introduction.
To explore this question, we take the same example as before, but assume that K ≥
2c o u n t r i e s ,f r o mj =( N +1− K),...,N, join a single currency area, eliminating the
transactions cost of monetary trade within the area. This reduces the number of separate
currencies in the world economy from N to N +1−K. But it also increases the economic
size of the N +1− K currency area.15
We calibrate as before so that initially N = 10, and assume that all peripheral countries
are of equal size ni =( 1− n)/(N − 1). Let K = 3, so that the number of currencies falls
from 10 to 8, and the size of the 8th ‘country’ is now 3(1−n)/(N −1). Now we ask, what
is the incentive for a peripheral country i/ ∈ {1,N+1−K} and for the N +1−K currency
area to undertake a bilateral deviation in order to trade currency directly with each other
rather than indirectly, using currency 1 as the vehicle currency. This trade-oﬀ now diﬀers
for country i and country N +1− K, since they do not have equivalent incentives for a
bilateral deviation. In both cases, the trade-oﬀ shifts dramatically downwards as shown
in Figure 9, indicating that the creation of a single currency area substantially increases
the incentive to engage in a bilateral deviation, both for remaining peripheral currencies,
outside the new single currency area, and for the new single currency area itself. As in
Figure 7, Figure 9 shows the gain from remaining in the VCE, relative to deviating to
bilateral currency trade, for a peripheral country and for a member of the single currency
15In this analysis, we take the currency area as a given institution. The determination of the number
and size of currency areas represents a separate question that cannot be addressed without enhancing the
model. This is because according to the assumptions made here, a currency area removes the transactions
cost of monetary exchange, and for a peripheral country, there is no gain to having a separate currency.
Thus, all countries j =2 ..N would wish to join the currency area. One interpretation of the experiment
here is that there are some set-up costs to a currency area that are not modeled explicitly, and that the
only eﬃcient currency area is that among the K countries. For instance, if governments had unpredictable
spending demands which required seigniorage revenue, then they would have to balance the needs for funds
against the reduced transactions costs from joining a currency area.
28area, as a function of the size of the VCE country. For n less than 0.3, this gain is negative.
In other words, there is a gain from deviating from the VCE both for a member of the
single currency area, and for a peripheral country, unless the vehicle currency country is 30
percent of world GDP. An equivalent interpretation is that the maximum rate of inﬂation
that the VCE country can sustain without triggering a deviation, shifts sharply downwards.
In comparison with Figure 8 where all peripheral countries are of equal size, the maximum
rate of quarterly inﬂation that the VCE country can sustain when n =0 .25, is now only
0.4 percent.
This example suggests that the dominance of a vehicle currency is limited in a very
natural way by the opening up of an outside single currency area, both because it increases
t h ee c o n o m i cs i z eo fn o n - V Cc u r r e n c ye c o n o m i es, and because it reduces the total number
of currencies in existence. In separate ways, both eﬀects increase the incentive to abandon
a vehicle currency.
5.3. Choice among Vehicle Currencies
The calculations in previous two subsections can be interpreted as measures of the restric-
tions imposed on the monetary policy of the vehicle currency in order to avoid bilateral
deviations among peripheral countries. If these conditions fail, then of course all countries
would have an incentive for a bilateral deviation. In this subsection, we perform another
robustness check on the vehicle currency equilibrium. We explore the consequences of a
switch from one vehicle currency to a second vehicle currency, where the switch is under-
taken jointly by all peripheral countries in unison.
First ignore country size diﬀerences, and assume that ni =1 /N for all i =1 ,...,N.
We wish to compare the welfare from one vehicle currency equilibrium with an alternative
vehicle currency. Assume initially that currency N is the vehicle currency, and denote this
equilibrium VCN. Now compare this with another equilibrium where another currency
is chosen as the vehicle currency. Without loss of generality, assume this is currency 1,
and denote this equilibrium as VC1. Since countries are identical in all respects except
money growth rates, the only source of welfare diﬀerence between VC1a n dVCN arises
from diﬀerences in γ1 and γN.
To compare the two equilibria, we recall the following properties of the vehicle currency
equilibrium from the previous sections: when currency N is the vehicle currency i, ciN
(i 6= N) is decreasing in γN, (ii) cii is independent of γN; and (iii) cij (j 6= i,N) decreases
in γN. Together these properties imply that all countries j =2 ,...,N will gain from the
switch to VC1 if and only if γ1 <γ N.. This follows because by property (i), cVC1
i1 >c VCN
iN ,
















γ1/β +( γ1 − 1)(N − 2)[1 − (N − 1)Nφ]
1 − N2φ
.
The inequality follows from property (iii) above, and the assumption γN >γ 1, while the
equality follows from re-arranging terms. The last expression is increasing in γ1 and it is
greater than one when γ1 =1 .T h u s ,cVC1
1i /cVCN
1i > 1f o ra l lγ1 ≥ 1.
29We may also verify that cVC1
1N >c VCN
1N for all γ1 ≥ 1. However, it is not necessarily true
that cVC1
11 >c VCN
11 ,e v e nw h e nγ1 ≥ 1; since more of good 1 is used up in transactions costs
in VC1t h a ni nVCN. However, given the logarithmic utility function, country 1’s utility
gain from consumption of good N will oﬀset any losses from consumption of good 1, in
utility terms, when comparing VC1w i t hVCN.T h a t i s , ( c1Nc11)
VC1 > (c1Nc11)
VCN.16
Given this, we may conclude with the following proposition regarding the robustness of a
vehicle currency with respect to joint deviations:
Proposition 5.2. Assume n =1 /N,a n dγ1 <γ N. Every peripheral country i (6= N,1)
is strictly better oﬀ in VC1 than in VCN.I fγ1 ≥ 1, then country 1 is strictly better oﬀ
in VC1 than in VCN. Therefore, VCN i sn o tr o b u s tt oaj o i n td e v i a t i o nt oVC1 by the
peripheral countries together. On the other hand, if γ1 >γ N,t h e nVCN is robust to the
joint deviation.
Figure 10 illustrates the trade-oﬀ (in the more general case where n 6=1 /N along the
lines of Figure 8, except now representing the incentive for countries i =2 ,...,N − 1t o
deviate from the VCN and adopt currency 1 as the vehicle currency. Again, we assume
here that ni =( 1−n)/(N −1), and again we assume that N = 10. The three loci represent
respectively, values of γN equal to 1, 1.009, (as in the baseline calibration), and 1.02. If
country N follows a policy of complete price stability (γN = 1), then, even if country 1
represents a large fraction of the world economy e.g. n =0 .5, VCN is robust to a joint
deviation by all peripheral countries, so long as γ1 > 1.01.
Thus, we again ﬁnd that the option of deviating, where here it is a joint deviation
to a new vehicle currency, may place tight restrictions on the monetary policy of the VC
country required to ensure sustainability of the VCE.
5.4. Co-existence of Vehicle Currencies
S of a rw eh a v ed i s c u s s e do n l yc a s e sw h e r eo n ev e hicle currency was used by all peripheral
countries. But there is some evidence of ‘currency blocs’, in which certain geographic
regions adopt regionally dominant currencies for intra-regional trade, but use alternative
currencies for inter-regional trade. For instance, EU countries not in the euro area have
begun to trade with one another in euro (Papademos, 2006), while it is well known that in
Asia, the US dollar is the widely accepted trade currency (McKinnon and Schnabl, 2003).
Is it possible to have multiple vehicle currencies exist within the modeling structure here?















The last expression is an increasing function of γ1 and its value at γ1 =1i sg r e a t e rt h a no n e . T h u s ,
(c1Nc11)
VC1 > (c1Nc11)
VCN for all γ1 ≥ 1.
30We brieﬂy discuss this by way of a simple example in which there are hypothetically two
vehicle currencies, and deﬁne the sense in which both vehicle currencies can co-exist.
Say that currencies 1 and 2 are both vehicle currencies. Assume that all trading posts
1i and 2i,f o ri =3 ,...,N are open. In addition, just to make the example easier, assume
that all peripheral countries i =3 ,...,Nare of equal size. Since all trading posts between 1,
2, and all peripheral countries are open, a peripheral country i may obtain currency j 6= i
through the 1i and 1j posts, or the 2i and 2j posts. Then it is easy to see that generically,
only one vehicle currency will be used. This is because the choice of whether to use vehicle
currency 1 or vehicle currency 2 depends on a comparison of the cost of obtaining currency j
through currency 1, which is γ1sa
1j/sb







2i, then no peripheral countries will use currency
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In this example, therefore, there can be only one vehicle currency, if we deﬁne a vehicle
currency as one which has open trading posts with all other currencies. But it is possible
to have ‘local’ vehicle currencies in the following sense. Take the example again where
currencies 1 and 2 are vehicle currencies. Instead of all posts 1i and 2i being open, however,
assume that currency 1 has active trading posts only with currencies I1 = {3,...,N/2},
(assuming N is even), while currency 2 has active posts only with currencies I2 = {N/2+
1,...,N}. In this case agents in peripheral countries i ∈ I1 use currency 1 to purchase
currency j ∈ I1, j 6=1 ,2,i,a n ds i m i l a r l ya g e n t si nI2 will use currency 2 to obtain
other peripheral currencies in I2. But, since there are no trading posts 1i, i ∈ I2 or 2i,
i ∈ I1, agents in peripheral countries must trade in both vehicle currencies in order to trade
currencies between I1 and I2. For instance, in order for agent i ∈ I1 to purchase goods
of country j ∈ I2,s h em u s tﬁrst purchase currency 1. Then, in the next period, she will
trade currency 1 for currency 2 at the 12 trading post. Finally, in the period after that,
she obtains currency j at the 2j trading post, and consumes good j.
Clearly this equilibrium with local vehicle currencies is robust to individual deviations,
since there is only a single channel within which to aﬀect all money trades. Hence, the two
vehicle currencies can co-exist so long as they do not overlap within regional sub-groupings.
For brevity however, we defer a full analysis of this case to a future paper.
6. Conclusions
This paper has developed a model in which a globally acceptable currency can function as
a medium of exchange among countries, facilitating international trade, and economizing
on resources when trading currencies requires costly transactions technologies. By elimi-
nating the need to set up bilateral currency trading posts among all possible countries, a
vehicle country reduces the average cost of currency trade. But the cost savings are distrib-
uted unevenly, with the center country gaining disproportionately. With a small number
of countries, peripheral countries will be worse oﬀ with a vehicle currency relative to a
symmetric trading equilibrium. But the gains from a vehicle currency may be substantial
31when there are a large number of countries and currencies, and when the centre country
is large relative to peripheral countries. Even with many countries, however, these gains
are eroded by higher rates of inﬂa t i o ni nt h eV Cc o u n t r y .I fi n ﬂation in the center country
goes to high, then our robustness analysis suggests that the use of the vehicle currency will
collapse.
The model could be extended in a number of ways. We could allow for uncertainty
in money growth and output levels. In this case, the risk-hedging properties of a vehicle
currency would be important, in addition to its exchange use. We could also do a more
explicit welfare analysis of monetary policy, assuming a social planner that weights each
countries utility and can make monetary transfers across countries. We leave these issues
for future research.
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34Appendix
A. Derivations for Sections 3 and 4
First, we derive (3.7) and (3.8). Let the current-value Lagrangian multiplier be λii for (3.1),
λij for (3.2), ηii for (3.3), ηij for (3.4) and (3.5), and ψij for (3.6). With the logarithmic
utility function, the ﬁrst-order conditions for cij and m0







λij(+1) + ψij = ηij, (A.1)










ηij (i<j ); ηii = s
b
jiηij (i>j ). (A.2)
Dividing (A.1) for j 6= i by the condition for j = i, and using (A.2), we obtain (3.7) and
(3.8).
Second, we derive (4.5) and (4.6). Let the current-value Lagrangian multiplier be ηii
for (4.1), ηij for (4.3), ηi1 for (4.2), and μi1 for (4.4). As in the STE, the multiplier is λii
for (3.1), λij for (3.2), and ψij f o r( 3 . 6 ) .I ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a tt h eﬁrst-order conditions
for cij and m0




i1 are as follows:
ηii = s
b
1iηi1,i 6=1 , (A.3)
ηi1 + μi1 = ηij/s
a
1j,j 6= i,1. (A.4)
The envelope conditions for mij are:
λij = ηij (j 6=1 ) ; λi1 = ηi1 + μi1. (A.5)
Substituting the last condition into (A.4) yields ηij = sa
1jλi1 for all j 6= i,1. Dividing (A.1)
for j = i by (A.1) for j = 1, and using (A.3), we obtain (4.5).
To establish (4.6), we show that ψi1 =0f o ra l li 6= 1. Suppose, to the contrary, that
ψi1 > 0. Then, m0
i1 = n1p1ci1,a n ds omi1(+1) = 0 by (3.2). With (4.4), this further implies
f
1j
i1(+1) =0f o ra l lj 6= i. That is, the household will have no foreign currency in the next
period. As a result, consumption of foreigng o o d sw i l lb ez e r o .T h i si sn o to p t i m a ls i n c e
the marginal utility of such consumption is inﬁnite when consumption is zero.


















35The ﬁrst equality comes from a result derived above, the second equality is obvious, and
the last equality comes from (A.3). Now, dividing (A.1) for j 6= i,1 in the next period by
(A.1) for j = i in the current period, and using the above condition, we get (4.6).
Third, we derive the results (4.7) — (4.11). For (4.7), consider a household in a country
i 6= 1. Notice that the household spends the domestic currency in the current period to
acquire currency 1 and to purchase domestic goods. Part of currency 1 that the household
acquires today is spent on country 1 goods. The rest will be spent in the next period
to purchase other peripheral currencies which, in turn, will be spent on goods of these
peripheral countries. Thus, the household’s holdings of domestic currency at the beginning
of the period, mii =1 /ni, are equal to the sum of three types of expenditures of the
household: the current expenditure on domestic goods, the current expenditure on country
1 goods, and the expenditure in the next period on goods of other peripheral countries.
The three terms on the right-hand side of (4.7) are the amounts of these expenditures.
Substituting 4.5) and (4.6), we obtain (4.8). The result (4.9) comes from the fact that
the household spends all domestic currency on domestic goods and on acquiring the vehicle





1jnjpjcij for j 6= i,1.
The result (4.11) comes from (4.4).
Finally, we prove Proposition 4.1 by deriving (4.19) and (4.20). For (4.19), substitute





























































Substituting this result into the left-hand side of the previous equation yields (4.19).











ii from (4.9) and sb
1i from (4.19) yields (4.20).
B .P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . 2
















+[ β(N − 1) + γ1](1− N2φ1)
1+β(N − 1+ 1
γ1)
36Using these, the solutions for sb
1i and sa
1i/sa
1i may be written
sb
1i
β +( 1− β)2/N
=
N(1 − N2φ)
β(N − 1)(N − 2)(1 − N2φ)+N − β( 1






β(N − 2) + 1 − β(N − 1+ 1
γ1)(N − 2)Nφ
(1 − N2φ)[β(N − 2) + 1 − (β(N − 2) + 2)Nφ]
(B.1)
The solutions for m11 and p1 are
1 − n1m11 =
1 − N2φ1









N − β( 1
γ1 − 1)(N − 2)
i
β(N − 1)(N − 2)(1 − N2φ1)+N − β( 1
γ1 − 1)(N − 2)
Then, using these solutions in the VCE formulas for consumption (4.5), (4.6), and (4.8),
we get, for i 6=1a n dj 6= i,1, we have:
cii =
1












β (1 − N2φ1)[β(N − 2) + 1 − (β(N − 2) + 2)Nφj]
γ1 [β +( 1− β)2/N]
h
β(N − 2) + 1 − β(N − 1+ 1
γ1)(N − 2)Nφ1
i. (B.4)







(N − 2)[1 − (N − 1)Nφ1]+1
N − β( 1

















































ij :c o u n t r yi’s consumption of country j’s goods
in VCE relative to STE
Figure 1. Relative consumption levels in VCE to STE














Figure 2 (N=10, γ1=1.009, φ=0.0005)
n (world share of country 1)
dc1,dc i,dcw: equivalent consumption changes for country 1, i and the world (w)
Figure 2. Gains to VCE with a transaction cost φ =0 .0005














Figure 3 (N=10, γ1=1.009, φ=0.001)
n (world share of country 1)
dc1,dc i,dcw: equivalent consumption changes for country 1, i and the world (w)
Figure 3. Gains to VCE with a transaction cost φ =0 .001












Figure 4 (n=0.1, γ1=1.009)
N (number of countries)
dc1,dc i: equivalent consumption changes for country 1 and i
Figure 4. Gains to VCE as a function of N (with n =1 /N and γ1 =1 .009)














Figure 5 (N=10, γ1=1)
n (world share of country 1)
dc1,dc i,dcw: equivalent consumption changes for country 1, i and the world (w)
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Gai ns to VCE for peripheral  country (γ1=1.009)
Gai ns to VCE for peripheral  country (γ1=1.036)
Gai ns to VCE for peripheral  country (γ1=1.044)
Gains to VCE for peripheral country (γ 1=1.009)
Gains to VCE for peripheral country (γ 1=1.036)
Gains to VCE for peripheral country (γ 1=1.044)
n (world share of country 1)







0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
Gains to VCE relative to STE for periphery
(γ1=1.009)
Gains to VCE relative to a bilateral deviation
Gains to VCE relative to STE for periphery (γ 1=1.009)
Gains to VCE relative to a bilateral deviation
n (world share of country 1)









0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
γ 1 to equalize STE and VCE
γ 1 to el imi nate incentive for bi lateral devi ati on
γ 1  to equalize STE and VCE
γ 1  to eliminate incentive for bilateral deviation
n (world share of count ry 1)
Figure 8. Threshold levels of VC money growth γ1 below which







0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
G ain s to V CE re la tive to  STE  for p erip hery (γ N=1.009)
G ain s to V CE re la tive to  a b ilate ra l d evia tio n: pe riph ery
G ain s to V CE re la tive to  a b ilate ra l d evia tio n: sin gle currency area
G ains to  V CE  relative to ST E  for perip hery (γN =1.009)
G ains to  V CE  relative to a bilateral d eviatio n: p eriphery
Gains to V CE relative to a bilateral deviation: single currency area
n (world share of country 1)
Figure 9. Gains to VCE relative to a bilateral deviation: peripheral
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γ1 to eliminate incentive for joint deviation when γN=1 
γ1 to eliminate incentive for joint deviation when γN=1.009
γ1 to eliminate incentive for joint deviation when γN=1.02
γ1 to eliminate incentive for joint deviation when γN=1 
γ1 to eliminate incentive for joint deviation when γN=1.009
γ1 to eliminate incentive for joint deviation when γN=1.02
g
n (world share of country 1)
Figure 10. Threshold levels of money growth γ1 above which peripheral
countries do not switch from currency N as the VC to currency 1
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